The 2015 hospital treatment choice reform in Norway: Continuity or change?  by Ringard, Ånen et al.
Health Policy 120 (2016) 350–355
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Health  Policy
j ourna l ho me  pa g e: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /hea l thpol
Health  Reform  Monitor
The  2015  hospital  treatment  choice  reform  in  Norway:
Continuity  or  change?
Ånen  Ringarda,∗,  Ingrid  Sperre  Saunesa,  Anna  Saganb
a The Knowledge Centre for the Health Services, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Norway
b United Kingdom Observatory on Health Systems and Polices, LSE Health, United Kingdom
a  r  t  i c  l  e  i  n  f  o
Article history:
Received 30 June 2015
Received in revised form 23 February 2016
Accepted 25 February 2016
Keywords:
Patient choice
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In several  European  countries,  including  Norway,  polices  to increase  patient  choice  of hos-
pital provider  have  remained  high  on the  political  agenda.  The  main  reason  behind  the
interest  in  hospital  choice  reforms  in  Norway  has  been  the belief  that increasing  choice  can
remedy  the persistent  problem  of  long  waiting  times  for elective  hospital  care.  Prior  to  the
2013 General  Election,  the  Conservative  Party  campaigned  in favour  of a  new  choice  reform:
“the treatment  choice  reform”.  This  article  describes  the background  and  process  leading




the  content  and  discusses  possible  implications  of  the  reform  for  patients,  providers  and
government  bodies.  In sum,  the reform  contains  elements  of both  continuity  and  change.
The main  novelty  of the  reform  lies  in  the  increased  role  of  private  for-proﬁt  healthcare
providers.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
1. Institutional setting and reform background
As in most European countries, statutory coverage in
Norway is obligatory and opting out is not permitted. There
is no choice of the statutory beneﬁts package but patients
are allowed to choose their healthcare provider. Healthcare
provision is organized at two main levels, municipalities
and state. The municipalities are responsible for primary
care and enjoy a great deal of freedom in organizing health
services. Patients are in general free to choose their gen-
eral practitioner (GP). GPs act as gatekeepers responsible
for referring patients to specialist care, i.e., a privately prac-
ticing specialist or a hospital. The referral process normally
comprises the following stages: (1) the GP examines the
patient and, if specialist care is needed, writes a letter of
referral; (2) the referral is assessed by a public hospital; (3)
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the hospital determines if care is needed and if the deci-
sion is afﬁrmative the hospital grants the patient the right
to treatment within a speciﬁed period of time (waiting time
guarantee); (4) if the guaranteed waiting time is exceeded
by the hospital, the patient is allowed to select an alter-
native provider (either another public hospital or a private
hospital under contract with the Regional Health Author-
ity (RHA)) [1]. The responsibility for specialist care lies with
the state—the owner of the four RHAs, which in turn own
hospital trusts. The Ministry of Health inﬂuences the activ-
ity of the RHAs (e.g., what their budget allocation should be
spent on) through its annual “letters of instruction”. These
letters are supplemented by annual circular letters from
the Directorate of Health focusing on issues such as quality
of care, e-health, etc. The Directorate is an agency subordi-
nate to the Ministry and is involved in implementation of
healthcare policies.
Waiting times for elective hospital care have been seen
as a major shortcoming of the healthcare system since mid-
1980s and have been the motivation behind a number of
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aiting-time guarantees and choice reforms [1,2]. Since
001, somatic patients have had the right to choose any
ublic hospital in the country (but the level of hospital,
econdary or tertiary, could not be chosen) [3]. Subse-
uently, patient choice was expanded to include private
ospitals contracted by the RHAs (patients who received
are at private hospitals not contracted by the RHAs had
o pay for it out of their pocket). However, this expansion
id not necessarily mean a major change for the patients
n terms of increasing their choice as almost all hospi-
als in Norway (approximately 99%) are publicly owned
nd funded through public budgets [4]. Not-for-proﬁt pri-
ate hospitals, often organized as foundations owned by
deological organizations such as the church, are publicly
unded and seen as part of the public healthcare services.
rivate for-proﬁt (PFP) providers play a small role in the
rovision of specialist care, as less than 1% of hospital beds
re in private for-proﬁt hospitals [1]. The largest proportion
f private provision of somatic hospital care is found for
lective day surgery (about 10%) [5]. Other patient and user
roups, such as psychiatric patients and patients in need
f treatment for alcohol and substance use have also been
ranted the right to choose a hospital/institution (in 2004
nd 2005, respectively). In recent years, the RHAs have also
tarted offering patients the option to receive rehabilitation
are in a different region.
Although patient choice can contribute to reducing
ospital-waiting times for individual patients [6,7], an
verall effect on waiting times in Norway has yet to be
emonstrated. The waiting times problem has persisted
nd not left the policy debate. According to a 2010 OECD
urvey, 21% of Norwegian respondents had to wait four
onths or more for elective surgery (third highest score
fter Canada (25%) and Sweden (22%)) [8,9]. Between 2011
nd 2014, the average waiting times were the highest for
omatic treatment (70 and 80 days), with patient wait-
ng for orthopaedic and medically essential plastic surgery
acing the longest waiting times. For alcohol and drug treat-
ent a reduction in waiting times was observed, from
bout 75 days in 2011 to about 60 days in 2014. For psy-
hiatric care, the average waiting times remained stable at
bout 55 days [10].
The article aims to describe the background and pro-
ess leading up to introduction of the new treatment choice
eform in late 2015. It provides a description of its content
nd discusses possible implications of the reform for the
atients, providers and other stakeholders.
. Policy goals and policy process
.1. Policy development
In mid-June 2014, the government launched what they
amed the “reform of free treatment choice in special-
st care” [11]. The issue appeared on the political agenda
rior to the General Election in September 2013, with the
onservative Party campaigning in favour of extending
atients’ choice of hospital. The Conservative Party won
he 2013 elections and went on to form a governmental
oalition with the Progress Party. The two parties are sup-
orted by the centrist Christian Democratic Party and the 120 (2016) 350–355 351
Liberal Party in Parliament. With respect to healthcare, the
coalition parties agreed that “The Government will (. . .)
carry out a major reform of the health service. Patients’
rights will be strengthened and individuals will be given the
right to choose their healthcare provider. This will ensure
that patients will not have to wait in queues when private
and non-proﬁt healthcare providers have available capac-
ity” [12]. Thus, the primary focus of the reform was on
strengthening patients’ rights by increasing their choice of
healthcare provider, with shorter waiting times for elec-
tive care being the more immediate goal. Private providers
without a tender agreement with the RHAs were to be
included in this extended choice, increasing the pool of
providers that patients can choose from.
Immediately after the General Elections in September
2013 the Ministry of Health and Care Services began
drafting a proposal for the announced reform. The Prime
Minister ofﬁcially presented the draft proposal in June
2014, emphasizing once again that the reform was
intended to extend the existing choice scheme and reduce
waiting times for elective hospital care. The proposed
reform would entail amending several existing policy tools,
including payment mechanisms and ICT-systems. The pro-
posal also called for new regulations in the following areas:
a system of granting approvals for private hospitals to be
included in the treatment choice scheme would be estab-
lished (but it was  not detailed in the proposal) and a new
system for quality assurance would be set up, giving the
RHAs the responsibility for assuring quality among private
hospitals included in the scheme [11].
2.2. The public consultation process and key stakeholder
positions
After the proposal was  presented, the Ministry opened
the customary public consultation process to provide an
opportunity for affected stakeholders to state their opin-
ions. The consultation process lasted three months and
elicited about 100 responses [13]. Fig. 1 summarizes the
position of key stakeholders.
Several of the largest patient organizations (e.g., the
Federation of Organizations of Disabled People, the Can-
cer Society and the Patient Organization for Circulatory
Diseases) expressed concerns about the proposal. The key
reasons were: complexity of the reform and its adminis-
trative costs and the opportunity for private hospitals to
prioritize to patients with more “easy-to-treat” conditions.
Another issue was the implications for workforce planning
in the public part of the system, given that more private
providers would compete for the same experts. Patient
representatives from the public hospital boards were also
worried that private hospitals would prioritize “easy-to-
treat” patients and suggested, in a common statement, that
no private hospitals should be granted the right to assess
GP referrals and to grant individual patients the right to
specialist care. The Union for senior citizens expressed a
general concern about the ongoing centralization of spe-
cialist care, and feared that the choice available to older
could be restricted patients due to longer travel distances to
hospitals. However, their position and the position of other
patient groups were more nuanced and some aspects of the
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Fig. 1. Stakeholders position towards the pr
reform were assessed positively: patient representatives
from the public hospital boards welcomed the fact that the
reform would remove the division between patients who
could afford to access private care and those who could not.
The Union for senior citizens also supported the opening
of the market to more private providers, as they believed
it to improve overall access to care. Organizations within
the ﬁelds of mental health and substance use were in gen-
eral more supportive of the proposal, but emphasized the
need for the simultaneous development of decision making
support systems.
The South-Eastern RHA (the biggest RHA in terms of
population and number of hospitals) was sceptical about
the introduction of a new quality regime linked to the
approval of private hospitals and the changes in the ﬁnan-
cing mechanisms. The RHA foresaw two different quality
regimes and several ﬁnancing mechanisms. The position of
other RHAs was in line with that of the South-Eastern RHA.
The local hospital trusts supported their respective RHAs,
adding that a rapid increase of private hospitals could lead
to staff shortage in the public sector.
The Norwegian Nurses Organisation (NNO) was scepti-
cal about the increased role of private for-proﬁt providers.
The NNO was unconvinced that the impact of the reform
on public hospitals and municipalities had been sufﬁciently
analysed. More speciﬁcally, they were concerned whether
it would be possible to assure provision of well-coordinated
care when patient pathways would be partly transferred to
private providers. They also feared staff shortage in public
hospitals.
Unsurprisingly, the proposal was supported by PFP-
hospitals, as it would potentially give them access to more
public funding as well as a more important role in the pro-
vision of specialist care. They were in favour of having a
central quality assurance system applicable to all hospitals,
which would ensure that the same quality standards apply
to all providers. At the same time, they expressed concerns
about whether the proposed scheme would be sufﬁciently
funded to encourage the establishment of more private
hospitals. Contrary to the NNO, the Norwegian Medicalchoice reform. Source: Authors’ evaluations.
Association was in favour of allowing more PFP providers
as a measure to improve access to specialist care.
2.3. The political debate and the adoption of the reform
Despite the concerns expressed in the consultation
process, in January 2015 the government decided to put
forward the largely unchanged proposal to the Parliament
[13,14]. The Parliament debated it between January and
late March. The voting on the legislative components of
the reform, i.e., the amendments of the Patients’ Rights
Act and the Specialist Health Services Act, took place in
mid-April. As expected, the opposition voted against the
proposal and the coalition parties, who have the majority
of seats in the Parliament, voted in favour. The amend-
ments were approved by the Parliament at the end of May
and their implementation was scheduled from 1 November
2015 [15].
3. Reform content and its implications
The patient treatment choice reform represents both a
continuation and change with respect to previous choice
reforms (see Table 1).
From the patients’ perspective, the main change is that
the choice of hospital provider is greater than before, as it
now also includes non-contracted private providers. The
fact that selected private hospitals are able to consider
GP referrals and grant the right to specialist care may
mean faster access to care for patients. The reform is not
expected to impact upon patients’ rights obtained through
the recently implemented EU Directive on cross-border
healthcare [14].
Previous restrictions on the annual number of patients
to be treated by public hospitals have been lifted, which
may  improve access. Although not a part of the free treat-
ment choice reform, this change is expected to improve
the position of public hospitals when the choice reform is
implemented [14]. Patient choice, however, did not apply
to private rehabilitation institutions. After the passing of
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Table 1
The 2015 treatment choice reform: what has changed?
Stakeholders Situation pre-2015 reform Changes introduced by 2015 reform
Patientsa Have a right to choose the hospital to which their GP
referral for specialist care will be sent to and
considered–choice among public hospitals only
Choice extended to certain private hospitals with a
tender agreement with the RHAs (details are being
elaborated)
Patients who were granted the right to specialist care have
a  choice of hospital provider among public hospitals and
private hospitals under contract with the RHAs (somatic
care, mental healthcare and addiction treatment are
included)
Choice of hospital provider extended to all private
hospitals, including those with no contract with the
RHAs
Rehabilitation care is not explicitly mentioned in the
scheme
Private rehabilitation institutions explicitly not
included, but the government has now put forward a
new proposal that includes rehabilitation care in
the scheme
Public hospitalsb Included; have the right to asses GP referrals and to grant
patients right to specialist care
Same as before; but no ﬁxed number of patients that
can be treatedc
Private providers under
contract with the public
system
Included but do not have the right to consider GP
referrals and grant patients the right to specialist care
(only public hospitals have this right now)
Same as before;  Selected private providers with a
tender agreement with the RHAs may  be given
permission to consider GP referrals and grant
patients the right to specialist care.
Private providers not under
contract with the public
system
Not included in the hospital choice Included in the treatment choice
RHAsd Arrange tenders and contract with private providers;
monitor provision of contracted care
Same as before;  Select private providers with a
tender agreement that can consider GP-referrals
and grant patients the right to specialist care
Expected to purchase more services from private
hospitals through public tendersc
Directorate of Health Collects, processes and presents updated and relevant
information to support patients who want to exercise their
right to choose (e.g., through websites, a dedicated
telephone line)
Same as before; Plus grants authorization to private
hospitals not under contract with the public system
and supervises them; determines the types of
services and prices that can be provided by private
non-contracted hospitals and pays them























pb Regulated by the Specialist Health Services Act and future secondary 
c Not part of the choice reform (previously implemented reforms).
d Regulated by the Health Authorities and Health Trusts Act.
he legislation, the government has put forward a new
roposal that, when enacted, will include private rehabili-
ation in the choice scheme.
The right given to certain private providers with a ten-
er agreement with the RHAs to assess GP referrals and
o grant patients the right to specialist care imply changes
or the RHAs. The RHAs will have to establish procedures
or granting (and withdrawing) permissions to consider GP
eferrals by private hospitals and for monitoring private
roviders that have been granted this right. The RHAs are
lso expected to buy more services from private providers
ia public tenders. This in turn may  constitute administra-
ive challenge to the planning, budgeting and monitoring
rocesses of the RHAs.
For PFP hospitals contracted by the RHAs, the main
hange is that in the future they may  be given the same
ight as public hospital to grant patients the right to spe-
ialist care. This change would, when implemented, give
hese providers the same control over patient ﬂows as
he public hospitals have today when it comes to receiv-
ng and assessing GP referrals. Moreover, they may  also
e given the authority to grant the patient the right to
pecialist care and to set individual waiting times for the
atients.on.
For the non-contracted PFP hospitals the key change is
their inclusion in the treatment choice scheme. In order to
be included, these providers must obtain a licence from
the Directorate of Health. Among the prerequisites are
the existence of internal quality assurance, communication
(with municipalities) and electronic patient information
systems. The government has, to cover the expected
increase in activity, granted an addition 150 million NOK
in 2015 and 400 million NOK in 2016.
Non-contracted PFP hospitals may  only provide health-
care services that are included on a pre-deﬁned list
(together with their respective prices) set by the Direc-
torate of Health. This list is based on the information about
bottlenecks in the public system (i.e., long waiting times).
Presently, the list only contains inpatient services in the
area of mental health and substance abuse treatment and
a limited number of services within somatic care. Private
hospitals are reimbursed on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis by
the Health Economics Administration (HELFO) [16] (see [1]
for more information about the role of HELFO). The Direc-
torate will also have to ensure that private non-contracted
providers satisfy the same standards for quality of care and
patient safety as public and private contracted providers.
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processing and presenting updated and relevant informa-
tion (e.g., on waiting times) to support patients who want
to exercise their right to choose.
4. Discussion
For many years, lengthy waiting times have been a
serious problem in the Norwegian healthcare system and
persisted in spite of the implementation of a number of
reforms aimed at reducing them. The new treatment choice
reform was proposed in June 2014 [11]. The legislative
framework was adopted by the Parliament in the spring of
2015 and is now being implemented [15]. While previous
reforms focused primarily on the patients’ right to choose
provider, less attention has been paid to developing the
supply side of the system. The 2015 reform has, although
the reform rhetoric has focused on patent choice, mainly
sought to develop the supply side of the system. First by
including private non-contracted providers into the choice
scheme and secondly to pave the way for a more enhanced
role for private providers under contract with the RHAs.
The draft proposed to ﬁrst extend the choice of treat-
ment to two  vulnerable patients groups: mental health
patients and patients with substance abuse problems. Pri-
vate provision is well established in these two areas which
may facilitate the establishment and inclusion of new
providers in the scheme. The government has also made it
clear that the RHAs will in the future be expected to buy
more services from private contracted providers, which
may  prove to be further incentive for new providers to
enter the market.
Important aspects of the reform are still being imple-
mented. The key question is to what extent the RHAs will
transfer the responsibility of receiving and assessing GP
referrals to private providers. The question is crucial for
the public system (the RHAs) in terms of both controlling
patients’ ﬂows into specialist care, and for having control
over their own budgets. Similarly, the Directorate needs
to implement the structure and processes for approv-
ing private non-contracted providers and to monitor their
activity.
The 2015 reform can be described as combining existing
demand side with new supply side policies, as it includes
both enhancing patient choice and increasing supply of
both public and private hospital services. Policies combin-
ing demand and supply measures have usually been found
to have a stronger effect on reducing waiting-times com-
pared to initiatives focusing primarily on either demand
or supply side measures [17]. Thus, other countries (e.g.,
within the OECD) struggling with lengthy waiting times
may  follow the developments in Norway with interest
[18].
5. Conclusion
In terms of the impact on health system goals, like
access, it is too early to speculate what the outcomes of the
reform may  be. The success of the reform in driving down
waiting times will depend to a large extent on whether
patients will actively exercise their increased opportunity
to choose. While prior to the 2001 reform Norwegians
[ 120 (2016) 350–355
were in general supportive of introducing choice of
hospital provider [19], only a few patients actually exer-
cised their right when seeking hospital care [7,20]. The
government has, however, promised to monitor the reform.
An evaluation, which will be administrated by the Nor-
wegian Research Council, is expected to start in 2016
[14].
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